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Abstract 
The commercial value of basic knowledge depends on the arrival of follow-up developments 
mostly from outside the boundaries of the inventing firm. Private returns would depend on 
the extent the inventing firm internalizes these follow-up developments. Such internalization 
is less likely to occur as knowledge becomes more general. This motivates the historical 
concern of insufficient private incentive for basic research. The present paper develops a 
novel empirical methodology of identifying unique patterns of knowledge flows (based on 
patent citations), which provide information about whether ‘spilled’ knowledge is reabsorbed 
by its inventor. Using comprehensive data on the largest 500 inventing firms in the US the 
classical problem of underinvestment in basic research is confirmed: spillovers of more 
general knowledge (and in this respect, more basic) are less likely to feed back to the 
inventing firm. This translates to lower private returns, as indicated by the effect of the R&D 
stock of the firm on its market value. 
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1. Introduction
It is well accepted that significant advancements in scientific knowledge must come from
basic research. Basic knowledge brings about follow-up developments that usually spread
over a wide range of fields and are conducted outside the boundaries of the inventing
firm. These follow-up developments substantiality enhance the commercial value of the
basic knowledge1. In a context of sequential innovation, the literature refers to the outside
follow-up developments of knowledge as knowledge spillovers (hereafter, spillovers).
For the inventing firm to capture substantial private rents it must internalize the
spillovers of its basic knowledge, i.e., the inventing firm must benefit from the value en-
hancing features added to its basic knowledge by other agents. This internalization can
take two forms: contractually and technologically. Under contractual internalization the
inventing firm license its knowledge to using firms, where under technological internaliza-
tion the spillovers created by the basic knowledge feed back into the future research of
the inventing firm. The present paper focuses on technological internalization as a chan-
nel through which private rents are appropriated. An empirical methodology (based on
patent citations) is developed to measure technological internalization and the extent it is
correlated with the generality of knowledge and the market value of the inventing firm.
The main hypothesis of this paper is that as knowledge becomes more general, and in
this respect more basic, the extent spillovers feed back to the inventing firm diminishes,
since only firms with a wider technology base could achieve such internalization. The em-
pirical prediction of this hypothesis is that there would be a negative correlation between
the generality of knowledge (measured as the number of fields where follow-up research is
inspired) and the extent this knowledge is reabsorbed by the inventing firm after external
follow-up developments arrive. Yet, a competing hypothesis is that firms choose the “ba-
sicness” level of their knowledge: basic knowledge is invented only by firms with a wide
technology base that allows internalizing private rents even when they are spread over
1An extreme form of basic knowledge is a General Purpose Technology (GPT). Helpman and Trajten-
berg (1997) show that the economic value of GPT arrives only after follow-up developments take place
(see also Bresnahan and Trajtenberg (1995) and Rosenberg and Trajtenberg (2004)).
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many fields. The empirical prediction of this competing hypothesis is that the negative
correlation between the generality of knowledge and internalization of spillovers will be
mitigated if not completely muted (since firms that conduct basic research are those that
are better able to technologically internalize it)2.
Distinguishing between these two hypotheses is extremely important for analyzing
the classical problem of underinvestment in basic research. Prior studies have adopted
a production function approach to measure the returns to basic research and whether
it is endogenously determined (Griliches (1986), Mansfield (1980)). The main finding
coming from this literature is that there is a very large premium at the firm level on basic
research. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that firms choose between basic and
applied research, since if this were the case we would expect private returns from both
types of research to be equalized3. The present paper develops a complementary dynamic
approach for studying the endogeniety of basic knowledge and the extent it is privately
rewarded. The main advantage of this new approach is that it enables capturing the
dynamic payoﬀ associated with knowledge when innovation is sequential. The dynamic
payoﬀ of internalizing the follow-up developments of knowledge would be higher for basic
knowledge. Yet, for basic knowledge such internalization is also less likely to occur.
Spillovers introduce two countervailing forces with respect to the incentive to innovate:
on the one hand, spillovers encourage future research, but on the other hand, they dis-
courage current research due to obsolescence of private rents (Schumpeter (1942), Aghion
and Howitt (1992) and Segerstrom, Anant, and Dinopoulos (1990)). Most of our under-
standing of the incentive to innovate (of both early inventors and their followers) lies on
how these two forces are reconciled. The conflict between these two forces is believed to
be much stronger for basic knowledge (Nelson (1959), Arrow (1962)).
2There may still be a negative correlation between generality and technological internalization even if
generality if endogenously chosen by firms due to the stochastic nature of research.
3In case there is a premium risk for basic research, private returns to basic research could be higher
than to applied research, even when the type of research is endogenously determined. Yet, the estimated
basic research premium is too high to represent such risk: Griliches (1986) reports that the private return
to basic research is eight times the private returns to applied research.
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The major contribution of this paper is in developing a novel empirical methodol-
ogy, based on patents and citations, for testing whether appropriability is lower for basic
knowledge in a dynamic framework of sequential innovation. Spillovers are measured as
the sequential developments of knowledge coming from outside the inventing firm. Based
on a complete characterization of the flow of knowledge underlying these spillovers, it
can be determined whether they feed back into the inventing firm. This feeding back of
spillovers is defined as technological internalization. Essentially, two types of spillovers are
distinguished: Internalized and Externalized. Internalized spillovers are spillovers that feed
back into the dynamic research of the inventing firm, whereas Externalized spillovers do
not. Technological internalization is defined as the share of Internalized spillovers created
by the invention. To the extent technological internalization is a channel through which
private rents are appropriated by (early) inventors, the present paper adds a great deal
to our understanding of the incentive to invent basic knowledge in a dynamic framework
where private rents depend on external follow-up research.
In addition to technological internalization, the inventing firm can internalize private
rents through a contractual channel. The literature has studied the theoretical aspects of
contractual internalization in a framework of sequential innovation, mainly as a mechanism
through which rents are shared between early innovators and their followers. Green and
Scotchmer (1995), Scotchmer (1996) and Chang (1995) study the theoretical aspects of the
eﬀect of a second-generation invention on the rents captured on the first-generation inven-
tion. O’Donoghue (1998) study the inventive step requirement in patent protection and
show how the inventive step can be chosen to minimize the trade-oﬀ between encouraging
current research and discouraging future research.
Yet, a large body of research shows that contractual internalization can fail to provide
suﬃcient private rents when transaction costs of contracting are high4 . In this case,
private rents could still be captured through the technological channel of internalization.
However, the theoretical and empirical literature has not yet investigated technological
4E.g., Eisenberg (1998), Grindley and Teece (1997), Hall and Ziedonis (2001), Lanjouw and Schanker-
man (2004) and Schankerman and Noel (2006).
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internalization. Focusing on the technological channel of internalization is especially im-
portant in light of the role of basic knowledge in creating “pure” spillovers. According to
the endogenous growth literature, “pure” spillovers, which occur when knowledge trans-
fers freely across inventors and inspires follow-up research in numerous fields, allow the
economy to depart from decreasing returns in the production of knowledge and achieve
sustained economic growth (Romer (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1991)). Contrac-
tual internalization hinders the free access to knowledge (since the receivers of knowledge
have to incur usage costs). Hence, contractual internalization should diminish economic
growth, through restricting the increasing returns in knowledge production. Yet, under
technological internalization, “pure” spillovers should not diminish in any obvious way,
since private rents can be captured without limiting future research.
Finding a negative correlation between technological internalization and the “basic-
ness” of knowledge would imply one of two things: either the incentive to invent basic
knowledge is reduced (i.e., current research diminishes), or that the inventing firms must
adopt the contractual channel to secure private rents (future research diminishes due to
reduction in “pure” spillovers, whereas current research may diminish as well in case con-
tractual internalization does not suﬃciently reward the inventing firm). In both cases,
lower technological internalization would reduce the pace of innovation and growth.
Henderson, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1997)5 show that patents and citations data can
be used to measure the generality of knowledge: knowledge embodied in a patent is more
general if the citations the patent receives spread over more technology fields. The present
paper adopts generality as the main characteristic of basic knowledge and tests its corre-
lation with technological internalization.
The essence of my empirical methodology for measuring technological internalization
is as follows: knowledge is identified as a patent and knowledge flow is identified as a
patent citation6. For each patent in the sample a “family-tree” is constructed, based on
5See also Hall and Trajtenberg (2005).
6Prior studies that empirically identified citations as knowledge flows are Jaﬀe, Henderson and Tra-
jtenberg (1993), Caballero and Jaﬀe (1993) and Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999).
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the citations the patent receives. Figure 1 illustrates this methodology for a simple case
of a sequence of three patents. Assume patent j cites patent i and patent k cites patent j.
Hence, the “family-tree” of patent i includes both patent j and patent k, where, patent j
is the ‘child’ of patent i and patent k is the ‘grandchild’ of patent i. Given this “family-
tree”, invention k is classified as an oﬀspring of invention i, even though knowledge did
not transfer directly from invention i to invention k. Applying this method to a high-order
sequence of citations allows tracing the trajectory knowledge has followed, while spreading
across inventions and firms. Based on these trajectories, it can be determined whether
knowledge that leaves the inventing firm and is further advanced by other firms will have
been reabsorbed by the inventing firm in a future period. (e.g., if patents i and k are held
by the same firm whereas patent j is owned by another firm, the spillovers created by
invention i are technologically internalized by the inventing firm).
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Figure 1: The “family-tree” of invention i
Based on the above methodology of identifying the diﬀusion pattern of knowledge,
technological internalization is measured. An econometric specification of the eﬀect of
generality on technological internalization is estimated for all patents held by the largest
500 inventing firms in the US. There is strong evidence of a negative eﬀect of generality
on technological internalization. This finding supports the hypothesis that basic research
is not endogenously chosen by firms and is less likely to be privately rewarded under the
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dynamic consideration of technological internalization.
Finally, a market value equation is estimated to confirm that technological internaliza-
tion is an important channel through which private rents are appropriated. The estimates
from the value function are then used to quantify the impact of generality on private re-
turns. A one standard deviation increase in technological internalization raises the market
valuation of an additional one dollar spent on R&D by 50 percent, evaluated at the mean.
Based on this estimate, a one standard deviation increase in the generality of knowledge
lowers private returns by 4.8 percent. Moving from the most specialized to the most gen-
eral knowledge (the two extreme points on the generality spectrum) lowers private returns
by 15.3 percent, evaluated at the mean.
In summary, a novel empirical methodology is developed to measure internalization of
private rents via a technological channel through which an inventor reabsorbs its knowl-
edge that is “spilled” to other agents. This measure of appropriability is used to test
the historical concern that basic knowledge is less privately rewarded. The econometric
findings support this concern.
The rest of this paper proceeds as following: section 2 presents the methodology for
measuring technological internalization, section 3 shows how generality is measured, sec-
tion 4 describes the data, section 5 reports the findings and section 6 concludes.
2. Measuring technological internalization
This section describes the conceptual and empirical issues regarding measuring technolog-
ical internalization. I start by showing how the technological contribution of an invention
is identified. Then, spillovers are defined as the external exploitation of the technological
contribution of the invention. Finally, it is shown how it is determined whether spillovers
feed back into the inventing firm to generate technological internalization.
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2.1. Technological contribution
Technological contribution is measured in two dimensions: the number of lines of research
the invention originates and the ‘quality’ of these lines of research. A line of research
is defined as a sequence of inventions, where every invention is a follow-up development
of its immediate ancestor. This sequence of inventions is required to be unique over a
given time period, i.e., not to be fully contained in a longer sequence of inventions. Define
the first invention in the line of research as an originating invention. A line of research
is assumed to be of a higher ‘quality’, if the number of subsequent developments of the
originating invention along the line of research is higher.
More formally, the technological contribution of invention i, TCi, is computed as the
‘quality’-weighted count of the lines of research invention i originates, as following7:
TCi =
X
k∈Ki
LRk ×Qk (2.1)
Where, Ki is the set of lines of research originated in invention i, k indexes lines of
research in this set, LRk is a dummy that receives the value 1 for line of research k and
zero otherwise, and Qk is the ‘quality’ of line of research k, as measured by the number of
inventions the line of research includes8.
Applying this formulation to the diﬀusion patterns in figure 2 yields:
TC1A = (1× 3) = 3 (2.2)
7Belenzon (2005) shows that this method of measuring technological contribution is equivalent to an
alternative approach of counting the number of oﬀspring inventions and weighing each one by the number
of direct citations received.
8Simply counting the number of inventions along a line of research may be an overestimate of the
technological contribution of the originating invention. A subsequent invention which is a high generation
of development of the originating invention is more likely to have benefited from other prior subsequent
inventions along the line of research. Thus, I always discount every generation by a discount factor of
δ per generation (which is assumed to be 15 percent), thus, Qk =
JX
j=1
δj−1, where, J is the number of
oﬀspring inventions in line of research k. Since the choice of the discount factor is arbitrary, other values
of δ are experimented with as robustness tests.
8
Where, TC1A is the technological contribution of invention A under pattern 1. The
term 1 in the brackets represents the singleton line of research A → B → C → D that
is adjusted by its ‘quality’, which is 3 (since it includes three subsequent developments of
invention A: B, C and D).
Similarly, the technological contribution of invention A under diﬀusion pattern 2, TC2A,
is:
TC2A = (1× 2) + (1× 2) = 4 (2.3)
The term 1 in the first brackets represents the line of research A → B → C that
is adjusted by its ‘quality’, which is 2 (since it includes two subsequent developments of
invention A: B and C). The term 1 in the second brackets represents the line of research
A → B → D that is adjusted by its ‘quality’, which is 2 as well (since it includes two
subsequent developments of invention A: B and D).
From this is concluded that the technological contribution of invention A under dif-
fusion pattern 2 is greater than its technological contribution under diﬀusion pattern 1
(intuitively, under both patterns of diﬀusion the number of subsequent developments is
equal. However, there are more research opportunities under pattern 2, as indicated by
the number of lines of research).
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Figure 2: Technological contribution
Figure 2: Circles in this figure represent inventions and arrows represent the direction
of knowledge flow. Pattern 1 illustrates a singleton path of knowledge flow, which is A→
B → C → D, while diﬀusion pattern 2 illustrates two unique paths of knowledge flows,
which are A → B → C and A → B → D. Determining the technological contribution of
invention A under the two diﬀusion patterns requires weighing these lines of research by
their ‘quality’, by measuring their length in terms of the number of inventions they include.
2.2. Spillovers
Spillovers are defined as the external exploitation of the technological contribution of an
invention, where external refers to the set of firms that are diﬀerent from the inventing
firm. Following this definition, spillovers are measured as the number of external inventions
along the lines of research the originating invention inspires.
For illustration, it is useful to examine a slightly more complicated diﬀusion pattern, as
shown in figure 3. Capital letters represent inventions, where arrows represent the direction
10
of knowledge flow. This figure plots the diﬀusion pattern of the originating invention A,
where the oﬀspring inventions are B, C, D, E, F , G, H, I and J . To complete the
presentation, the shape of each capital letter represents a diﬀerent firm, i.e., a circle firm
(the inventing firm), a triangle firm and a square firm.
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Figure 3: Measuring spillovers
Figure 3: This figure illustrates the diﬀusion pattern of the originating invention A.
Inventions are represented by a capital letter, while the firm that owns the inventions is
represented by a shape (e.g., the inventing firm is the circle, since it owns the originating
invention A). I define the spillovers created by invention A, given this diﬀusion pattern, as
the number of inventions that are owned by the square and triangle firms (all the firms in
the figure which are diﬀerent from the inventing firm) along the lines of research invention
A originates.
Following the methodology presented above, in order to measure the technological
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contribution of invention A, we need to identify the lines of research invention A originates
and weigh them by their ‘quality’. Since a line of research is defined as a singleton
sequence of subsequent developments of the originating knowledge, there are five such lines
of research: A→ B → D → H, A→ B → E → I, A→ C → F → I, A→ C → F → J
and A→ C → G→ J . The technological contribution of invention A following equation
(2.1) is given by:
TCA = (1× 3) + (1× 3) + (1× 3) + (1× 3) + (1× 3) = 15 (2.4)
Since spillovers are defined as the external inventions that compose the lines of research
an invention originates, they are formulated as:
Spilloversi =
X
k∈Ki
LRk × Sk (2.5)
Where, i is an originating invention, Ki is the set of lines of research invention i origi-
nates, k indexes lines of research in this set, LRk is a dummy that receives the value 1 for
line of research k and zero otherwise and Sk is the number of external inventions included
in line of research k. Following this formulation, the spillovers created by invention A are:
SpilloversA = (1× 3) + (1× 2) + (1× 2) + (1× 3) + (1× 3) = 13 (2.6)
Where, the second and third terms, (1× 2) and (1× 2) , correspond to the fact that
invention I is owned by the inventing firm. Thus, invention I is excluded from the spillovers
measure for invention A (the spillovers along lines of research A → B → E → I and
A→ C → F → I are based only on inventions B, E, C and F )9.
Finally, I aim at distinguishing between two types of spillovers: spillovers that con-
tribute to the dynamic research of the inventing firm and spillovers that do not.
9In some patterns of diﬀusion, the first subsequent development of the originating knowledge is done by
the inventing firm (which is identified as a self-citation). Hence, knowledge does not immediately spread
to other inventors. In this case, the ‘in-house’ subsequent development is not measured as spillovers (where
spillovers along such lines of research occur only if in a future generation knowledge leaves the boundaries
of the inventing firm).
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2.3. Internalized and Externalized lines of research
Two types of lines of research are identified: the first type is lines of research where the
originating knowledge leaves the inventing firm and returns to this firm after having been
further developed by other firms. The second type is lines of research where the originating
knowledge leaves the inventing firm and does not return. Spillovers along the former type
are internalized in the dynamic research of the inventing firm and, therefore, these lines of
research are defined as Internalized lines of research. However, spillovers along the latter
type do not contribute to the dynamic research of the inventing firm, therefore, these lines
of research are defined as Externalized lines of research.
Hence, the spillovers of an invention can be written as:
Spilloversi =
X
j∈Internalizedi
LRj × Sj +
X
t∈Externalizedi
LRt × St (2.7)
Where i denotes an originating invention, Internalizedi is the set of Internalized lines
of research originated in invention i, Externalizedi is the set of Externalized lines of
research originated in invention i, j indexes lines of research in the Internalizedi set and t
indexes lines of research in the Externalizedi set. I define the first term in the right-hand-
side of equation (2.7) as IntSpilli and the second term in the right-hand-side of equation
(2.7) as ExtSpilli. Thus, equation (2.7) becomes:
Spilloversi = IntSpilli +ExtSpilli (2.8)
Technological internalization, IntSharei, is defined as the ratio between IntSpilli and
Spilloversi.
To illustrate this decomposition, it is useful to refer back to figure 3. Out of the five lines
of research that invention A originates, two are Internalized and three are Externalized.
The set InternalizedA is:
InternalizedA = {A→ B → E → I,A→ C → F → I}
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Similarly, the set ExternalizedA is:
ExternalizedA = {A→ B → D→ H,A→ C → F → J,A→ C → G→ J}
Given this decomposition, IntSpillA = (1× 2) + (1× 2) = 4 (two external inventions
in the first line of research and two external inventions in the second line of research in
the InternalizedA set). Similarly, ExtSpillA = (1× 3) + (1× 3) + (1× 3) = 9 (three
external inventions in each of the three lines of research in the ExternalizedA set). Thus,
IntShareA is 413 .
2.4. Empirical methodology
Inventions are empirically identified as patents and knowledge flows as citations (where
knowledge flows from the cited patent to the citing patent). Patents and citations data
contain significant noise and bias10. Nonetheless, these data also oﬀer unique information
on the diﬀusion pattern of knowledge and sequential innovation, which I believe to be
extremely useful for exploring the ideas developed in this paper.
Hence, the inventions in figures 2 and 3 are empirically identified as patents, whereas
arrows are empirically identified as citations (e.g., an arrow from invention A to invention
B in figures 2 and 3 reflects the fact that patent B cites patent A). The task I am facing
is to eﬀectively draw figure 3 for the sample of originating inventions11.
A unique line of research is empirically identified as a singleton sequence of citations
(where, each patent cites its direct ancestor). A sequence of citations is defined as single-
ton, if it is not fully contained in a longer sequence of citations for the given time period
being explored. After extracting the lines of research for the sample of originating patents,
each line of research is classified as either Internalized or Externalized12.
10See, for example, Trajtenberg (1990) for the potential bias in patents as indicators for innovation
output, and Trajtenberg, Jaﬀe and Fogarty (2001) for a study on the noise component in citations as
indicators for knowledge flows.
11The design of this sample is explained below.
12The reader who is familiar with the economics of patents literature can find the definition of an
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The period for which lines of research are constructed is restricted to 15 years after the
grant year of the originating patent. For example, for a patent that was granted in 1975,
the youngest patents in all the lines of research it originates cannot be granted after 1990.
Further, citations along a line of research are added as long as the line of research has not
already been classified as Internalized13. Thus, this methodology extracts all the unique
trajectories where knowledge had left the boundaries of its inventor and returned to these
boundaries in a time period of 15 years after the knowledge had been created14, as well as
all the unique trajectories where knowledge had left the boundaries of the inventing firm
and did not return to these boundaries in the same time period15.
3. Generality of patents
The main characteristic of basic knowledge is the extent it spurs follow-up research in
many technology fields. Following Trajtenberg, Henderson and Jaﬀe (1997), patents are
argued to be more general if the citations they receive spread over a larger number of
fields.
The generality of patent i, denoted by Gi, is computed as one minus the HHI index
Internalized line of research similar to a self-citation. A self-citation is the case where a firm develops its
prior knowledge directly (the first generation of citation the patent receives comes from the inventing firm
itself). An Internalized line of research is the case where the firm indirectly develops its prior knowledge,
after it has been developed by other firms. Thus, an Internalized line of research is a unique indirect self-
citation, which I associate with a higher appropriability, as the existing literature does with self-citations
(e.g., Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2005)).
13E.g., consider the Internalized line of research A→ B → E → I that is presented in figure 3. Assume
that patent I is cited by patent K, such that this line of research becomes A → B → E → I → K.
The imposed restriction implies that only the line of research A→ B → E → I will be extracted for the
originating patent A.
14Since I refer to the grant year of the patent and not to its application year, the creation date of the
patented knowledge is actually earlier. However, my algorithm builds on the fact that a citing patent
cannot be cited before it cites. This crucial feature of the data can be exploited only by referring to the
grant year of the patent (see Belenzon (2005) for detail on the algorithm).
15It is important to note that this methodology incorporates the case where knowledge is first developed
sequentially ‘in-house’ by the inventing firm (i.e., self-citations). In numerous cases the inventing firm
develops the first follow-up inventions of the originating knowledge. In such lines of research knowledge
leaves the boundaries of the inventing firm via a higher order generation of citation. These lines of research
are classified as Internalized or Externalized following the same criterion described above.
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of concentration across the fields that cite patent i:
Gi = 1−
X
n
µ
CRin
CRi
¶2
(3.1)
Where, n denotes citing fields, CRin is the number of citations received by patent i
from patents in field n and CRi is the total number of citations received by patent i. Self-
citations are excluded fromGi, due to the interest in characterizing follow-up research that
is done outside the boundaries of the inventing firm16. The main technology breakdown
used in the econometric analysis is based on the three-digit US Classification (Nclass),
which includes 400 fields. Gi is based on citations received during the period 1975-1999.
Hall (2002) shows that Gi is downward biased in case patent i receives a small number
of citations and suggests the following bias-corrected measure:
cGi = µ CRiCRi − 1
¶
Gi (3.2)
Since cGi is based on technology field definitions, it is highly sensitive to measurement
error in drawing the boundaries between fields. For example, in case in the Drugs sector,
technology fields are defined more coarsely compared to the Computers sector, it is more
likely for a patent to be more general in the Computers sector when the propensity of
citations is stronger within sectors compared to between sectors. In order to mitigate
this concern, cGi is also constructed based on the following alternative technology classi-
fications17: International-Patent-Class (742 cells), Sub- International-Patent-Class (3008
cells), Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (HJT) subcategories (36 cells) and Manufacturing In-
dustry SIC-IPC classification (37 cells).
Finally, knowledge should be more general if it transfers to fields that are more tech-
nologically remote from the field in which the knowledge was originally invented. Later in
the paper, a more refine cGi measure is developed to take into account the technological
proximity between the citing fields and the field of the cited patent.
16The empirical results are robust to including self-citations in the construction of Gi.
17See Hall and Trajtenberg (2004).
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4. Data
Patents and citations data are taken from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Oﬃce from the
NBER archive. The sample of originating patents includes all cited patents held by the
largest 500 patenting firms in the US between 1969 and 198018. It is required that every
firm remains active during the complete period for which the sequences of citations are
constructed leaving the largest 492 inventing firms (all of which are active up to 1995,
which is the last year an oﬀspring patent can be added into a line of research). The set of
originating patents includes 104,694 patents19.
The sample of citing patents that participate in the sequences of citations includes
about 600,000 patents that are held by all US Compustat firms in the USPTO20. These
patents make around 1.7 million citations (either to the originating patents or to other cit-
ing patents21). Based on these citations, 13,107,634 lines of research (singleton sequences
of citations) are extracted, which are originated in 97,921 inventions. 6,773 patents that
appear in the initial set of originating patents do not originate Internalized or External-
ized lines of research (these patents originate lines of research in which all the follow-up
developments of the originating invention are done ‘in-house’). 999,718 lines of research
are classified as Internalized and are originated in 29,964 patents, while the remainder
12,107,916 lines of research are classified as Externalized and are originated in 97,212
18The year 1969 is the earliest year for which there is citations information for the patents held by the
firms in the sample. Also, in practice I could extract the diﬀusion pattern of patents that were granted
up to 1985, since the citations data goes up to 1999. However, there is a huge spike in the number of
citations in 1995 (see figure A3), where the number of citations rises by around 800,000 in the period
1995-1999. In addition to the feasibly of extracting sequences of citations from these huge data, there is
also a concern that the explosion in citations in this period is not associated with stronger learning and
sequential innovation, but with changes in the patenting behavior of firms, which could contaminate the
results.
19The set of originating patents includes 45 percent of all cited patents between 1969 and 1980 that are
held by US Compustat firms that were matched to the USPTO by Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001).
20Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001) matched 2466 US Compustat firms to the USPTO. The citing
patents of all these firms are allowed to take part in constructing the patterns of diﬀusion of the originating
patents. The sample of citing patents includes about 30 percent of all citing patents in the USPTO (and
50 percent of the citing patents where the main inventor is a US resident).
21Where 599,884 patents make 1,760,143 citations to 573,373 patents in the sample.
17
patents22 .
Detail on the algorithm developed to construct the diﬀusion data is provided in Be-
lenzon (2005).
Table 1 describes the variation of lines of research across technology sectors and time.
The largest number of lines of research per citation received by an originating patent is in
the “Electrical and Electronics” sector. This may indicate a high technological complexity
in this sector, where complexity refers to the various distinct ways along which knowledge
can be sequentially developed. 7.6 percent of the lines of research are Internalized. This
share appears to be rather stable over time, with an exception in “Drugs and Medicals”.
In the period 1978-1980 there is a large drop in the share of Internalized lines of research
in this sector, which may be associated with the Biomed revolution that took place at the
end of the 70’s. I plan to investigate this separately in a future research.
[Table 1 about here]
Table A1 provides summary statistics for the main patent variables. The average
technological internalization is 4.723 (i.e., on average, 4.7 percent of the spillovers created
by a patent are defined as Internalized). The unconditional correlation between IntShare
and cGi is -0.063 (with p < 0.01).
5. Estimation
The baseline specification links technological internalization to generality as following:
IntSharei = β0 + β1cGi + β2Ci tesi + Z 0iβ3 + τ i + φi + ηi + i (5.1)
Where, i denotes the originating patent, Citesi is the number of citations patent i
receives (over the period 1975-1999), Zi is a vector of additional controls described below,
ηi is a complete set of dummies for the inventing firms (the owner of patent i), τ i is a
22The remaining 709 originating patents inspire only Internalized lines research (thus, all the subsequent
generations of developments are done by the inventing firm).
23Belenzon (2005) shows that this percentage is rather stable over time and across fields.
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complete set of dummies for the grant year of patent i, φi is a complete set of dummies
for the field of patent i and i is an iid error term.
Cites are added as a control forcGi, since both measures are based on counts of forward
citations. As mentioned above, cGi is likely to be higher when a patent receives more
citations24. In case Cites has a negative eﬀect on IntShare, β1 will be downwards biased.
The set of grant year dummies, τ i, is included since patents are pooled from diﬀerent
time periods (1969-1980). The main variable that is likely to substantially vary over time
is Cites (see figure A3). This time trend may cause patents that are granted in later
periods to appear on average more general, if cGi is positively correlated with Cites.
The set of field dummies control for technology location: diﬀerent fields may system-
atically vary in terms of patterns of diﬀusion, which could aﬀect both IntShare an cGi.
A complete set of firm dummies is also included. Although the regression is at the
patent level, the underlying level of technological internalization is determined at the firm
level and should be aﬀected by firm-specific attributes. To the extent these attributes
are correlated with cGi, β1 would be biased. For example, firms that are more specialized
in research could be better at internalizing the spillovers of their knowledge. If more
specialized firms invent less general knowledge (as would be expected under the hypothesis
that basic research is endogenously determined), β1 will be downward biased.
Zi includes three additional controls: Complexity, PatShare and PatCon.
Complexityi - Complexityi measures the degree to which the fields that cite patent i
are diversified in terms of lines of research. Fields that include a higher average number
of lines of research are argued to be more complex (as there are more unique ways to
sequentially develop knowledge). Complexityi is calculated as following:
Complexityi =
X
n
ωn × Comn
Where, n denotes technology fields that cite patent i, ωn is the share of citations
24The bias-correction used in this paper aims to eliminate the downward bias in Gi when a patent
receives only few citations. The correlation between cGi and Cites is 0.07, compared to 0.23 for Gi
(uncorrected).
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patent i receives from technology field n and Comn is the technological complexity in field
n. Comn is defined as the average number of lines of research per citation received by an
originating patent (see table 1) and is based on the Nclass level.
A negative correlation between IntSharei and Complexityi would imply that it is
harder to internalize own spillovers in case these spillovers are spread over more lines of
research. This may indicate that specialization in research occurs not only between fields,
but also within fields across lines of research. In the absence of within-field specialization,
Complexityi should not negatively aﬀect the degree of technological internalization.
PatSharei - PatSharei measures the overlap between the fields that cite patent i and
the patent distribution of the inventing firm. A higher PatSharei implies a higher con-
centration of the research activity of the inventing firm across the citing fields. PatSharei
is expected to be positively correlated with IntShare: the inventing firm would find it
easier to internalize own spillovers where they are concentrated across fields to which the
research of the inventing firm is more directed. PatSharei is calculated as the HHI index
for the share of the inventing firm’s patents in the technology fields that cite patent i
(weighted by the share of citations patent i receives from every citing field):
PatSharei =
X
n
ωn × (Sharen)2
Where, Sharen is the share of patents the inventing firm has in technology field n and
ωn is as defined above.
PatConj - PatConj measures the research diversification of firm j as the HHI index
of the concentration of the firm’s patents across technology fields, as following:
PatConj =
X
k
(Sharek)
2
Where, j denotes the inventing firm, k denotes fields firm j operates in and Sharek is
the share of patents firm j has in field k out of the total patents firm j has (computed over
the period 1969-1999). Since PatCon is a firm-level measure (i.e., does not vary across
patents within firms), its eﬀect will not be identified in the presence of firm fixed-eﬀects,
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which are widely used in the econometric analysis. Yet, introducing PatConj is interesting
with regard to its correlation with cGi. To the extent firms decide the level of generality of
their knowledge, PatCon and cGi would be negatively correlated: more specialized firms
will choose more specialized knowledge.
5.1. Results
Table 2 summarizes the main estimation results. In column 1, equation (5.1) is estimated
without firm fixed-eﬀects (i.e., conditioning on cites received, fields dummies, year dum-
mies and a dummy for IntShare equals zero). The coeﬃcient on cGi (β1) is negative and
significant. This implies that patents that are cited by more fields exhibit less technological
internalization, which supports the main hypothesis of this paper.
In column 2, PatConj is added. The coeﬃcient on PatCon is positive and significant:
a higher concentration in research increases technological internalization. The positive
eﬀect of PatCon on IntShare is a consistent explanation to the finding reported by Hall
and Ziedonis (2001) of an increased specialization of entrant firms in the “Semiconduc-
tors” industry. In this industry sequential innovation plays a major role and the dynamic
consideration of technological internalization is likely to be important. Furthermore, β1
falls in absolute value when controlling for PatCon. This fall indicates a negative correla-
tion between PatConj and cGi (the correlation is -0.147 with a p value < 0.01), i.e., firms
that have a more diversified research capabilities invent more general knowledge. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that firms choose the level of generality of their knowledge:
in order to technologically appropriate significant private rents on general knowledge the
inventing firm would need to conduct follow-up research in numerous fields. Knowing
this, firms with more diversified research capabilities will choose to invent more general
knowledge. Yet, β1 remains negative and significant also after controlling for research
diversification.
In column 3, a complete set of firm dummies is added to control for the attributes
of firms that can aﬀect both IntShare and cGi. In this specification, only the variation
across patents within inventing firms is exploited. With firm fixed-eﬀects β1 continues to
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increase in absolute value, however, it remains negative and significant. Based on this
specification, at the mean, moving from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in cGi
lowers IntShare by 9 percent25.
When exploiting only the variation across patents within firms, there may still be a
patent-level variation in attributes that are correlated with both cGi and IntShare. In
case knowledge “spills”to technology fields that are more complex, where complexity is
measured as the technology field average number of lines of research originated in a patent,
it should become harder for the inventing firm to internalize a larger share of the spillovers
it creates. Complexity is added in column 4. Complexity has a negative and significant
eﬀect on IntShare, as expected. Finding this negative eﬀect implies that diversification
in research is evident not only between technology fields but also within technology fields
across lines of research (otherwise, technological internalization would not be harder to
achieve when citing fields have a higher average number of lines of research).
In order to illustrate the range of the eﬀect of Complexity, consider the following
calculation: suppose knowledge “spills” only to one technology field (cGi is zero). Con-
sider two extreme fields in term of their complexity: Nclass 438 (“Semiconductor Device
Manufacturing: Process”), which has a complexity measure of 112.326, and Nclass 139
(“Textiles: Weaving”), which has a complexity measure of 5.1. IntShare would be higher
in the latter pattern of diﬀusion by about 60 percent compared to the former27.
Technological internalization should be easier to achieve in case the inventing firm is
already active in research in the citing fields. To test this, column 5 adds PatShare,
which measures the overlap between the research activity of the inventing firm and the
fields that cite its knowledge. As expected, PatShare has a positive and significant eﬀect
on IntShare. Thus, the extent the inventing firm is active in the fields its knowledge
“spills” to, technological internalization would be higher. Evaluated at the mean, a one
25The predicted IntShare (evaluated at the mean) is 5.077 when cGi is at the 25th percentile. IntShare
drops to 4.594 when cGi increases to the 75th percentile.
26I.e., 112.3 lines of research per citation received by an originating patent.
27When knowledge “spills” to Nclass 438, the predicted IntShare, evaluated at the mean, is 3.365,
compared to 5.616, when knowledge “spills” to Nclass 139.
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standard deviation increase in PatShare raises IntShare by 15 percent (from 4.7 percent
to 5.4 percent).28
[Table 2 about here]
5.2. Robustness tests
5.2.1. Technological proximity between fields
cGi does not take into account the ‘distance’ knowledge travels across fields: knowledge
would be more general if it is cited by many fields that are also more technologically remote
from the cited field. In this section cGi is refined by weighting the citing fields according
to their technological distance from the field of patent i, as indicated by the propensity
of citations (fields that are closer to the field of patent i will receive a lower weight)29.
Following Caballero and Jaﬀe (1993) and Jaﬀe and Ttajtenberg (1999), the propensity of
citations is estimated by aggregating patents into “cells”, based on characteristics of the
citing and cited patents. The following equation is estimated by nonlinear least-squares:
ρss0tT = αss0αsαs0αTαt exp(−β1(T − t)) (1− exp (−β2(T − t))) (5.2)
Where, s denotes the field of the citing patent, s0 denotes the technology field of the
cited patent, T is the grant year of the citing patent and t is the grant year of the cited
patent. s includes 36 fields based on the HJT subcategory classification and s0 includes the
6 main fields. αss0 denotes a complete set of 215 dummies for all pair-wise combinations
of the citing and cited fields (36× 6− 1), αs is a complete set of dummies for the citing
fields (35 dummies), αs0 is a complete set of dummies for the cited technology fields (5
28Moreover, patents that create more spillovers could also be more general. In case spillovers are
negatively correlated with IntShare, β1 will be downward biased. In order to test this, I also add
Spillovers (the sum of IntSpill and ExtSpill) into the right-hand-side of equation (5.1). β1 increases
to -1.033 with a standard error of 0.128, where there is no important change in the other coeﬃcients.
The eﬀect of Spillovers is negative and significant: at the mean, a one standard deviation increase in
Spillovers lowers IntShare by 18 percent.
29It is also important to weight citing fields by the propensity to cite since larger fields are more likely
to cite a given patent. In case a patent is surrounded by large technology fields, it can appear to be
general simply because there is a higher probability it will be cited outside its own field.
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dummies), T is a complete set of year dummies for the citing patent (24 dummies for
the period 1975-1999) and t is a complete set of dummies for the grant year of the cited
patents (7 dummies for the period cohorts of the cited patents30). ρss0tT is computed as:
ρss0tT =
Css0tT
PsTPs0t
(5.3)
Where, Css0tT is the number of citations from the citing field s at year T to the cited
field s0 at year t, PsT is the number of citing patents in the cell and Ps0t is the number
cited patents in the cell31.
The main estimation results of equation (5.2) are summarized in table A5, which
reports the estimated set of coeﬃcients αss0 , dαss0. It is clearly evident that the propensity
of citations is much stronger within fields in the same main technology sector, which
implies that knowledge is less likely to travel across the boundaries of main technology
fields. This highlights the sensitivity of Gi to measurement error in the definition of the
boundaries of fields within the main technology fields. The next section tests this concern.
The propensity of citations between Nclass fields is estimated in two stages32: in the
first stage, equation (5.2) is estimated to obtain the predicted propensity of citations
between pairs of citing and cited fields as explained above (dαss0). In the second stage, the
propensity of citations from Nclass n to Nclass n0 is assumed to be proportional to dαss0 .
Thus, conditional on a citation coming from field s to field s0, the probability this citation
comes from a randomly drawn patent in Nclass n ∈ s to Nclass n0 ∈ s0 is:
pnn0 =dαss0 × p(n ∈ s | s)× p(n0 ∈ s0 | s0) (5.4)
Where, p(n ∈ s | s) is the probability that the citing patent belongs to field n, condi-
30The periods are: 1963-1969, 1970-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995 and 1996-1999.
31In order to deal with potential heteroskedasity and to improve eﬃciency, I always weight the obser-
vations by the reciprocal of the
p
(Nltg) (NLT ). This weighting does not importantly aﬀect the results,
however, it does improve the fit of the model (consistently with Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1999)).
32Potentially, one would allocate patents into cells in the most refine manner, i.e., at the Nclass level
(since cGi is based on the Nclass classification). However, this is not feasible computationally using this
estimation approach, as there are 400 Nclass fields, which would require estimating 400×400−1 coeﬃcients
(αss0).
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tional on the citation coming from field s and p(n0 ∈ s0 | s) is the probability that the cited
patent belongs to field n0, conditional on the citation being directed to field s0. p(n ∈ s | s)
is calculated as the share of patents in field n ∈ s out of the total patents in field s (over
the period, 1975-1999) and p(n0 ∈ s0 | s0) is calculated as the share of patents in field
n0 ∈ s0 out of all patents in field s0 (over the period 1963-1998). Finally, the weights, ωnn0
that are assigned to the citing technology fields are computed as ωnn0 = 11+pnn0
33.
The weighted measure of generality (WGi) is:
WGi = 1−
X
n
ωnn0
µ
CRin
CRi
¶2
(5.5)
WGi follows the same bias correction as Gi (denoted by [WGi). Table A4 summarizes
the main statistics for the variables used in estimating equation (5.2) and for WGi.
Table 3 reports the estimation results for[WGi for the equivalent specifications reported
in table 2. The eﬀect of [WGi is negative and significant in all specifications. Compared to
the estimation with cGi, the eﬀect of Compelxity remains unchanged, whereas the eﬀect
of PatShare rises. Overall, the results are stable to the more refine measure of generality
that also takes into account the distance knowledge has traveled across fields as inferred
from the estimated propensity of citations34.
[Table 3 about here]
5.2.2. Alternative breakdown of technology fields
The definition of generality builds on Nclass fields. In case there is a measurement error
in this classification that is correlated with IntShare, β1 will be biased. For example,
the number of diﬀerent Nclass fields in “Drugs and Medicals” is only 14, whereas the
33Other functional forms which are decreasing in the propensity to cite have been experimented with
(e.g., ωnn0 = 1− pnn0) to find a similar pattern of results.
34I also construct cGi while considering only citations from Nclass fields that are not in the same main
technology sector as patent i. The coeﬃcient on cGi in an equivalent specification to column 6 in table 2 is
-1.274 with a standard error of 0.154. Similarly, The coeﬃcient on cGi in an equivalent specification when
only considering citations from Nclass fields that are not in the same HJT subcategory fields as patent i
is -1.673 with a standard error of -0.182.
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number Nclass fields in “Electrical and Electronics” is 50. Thus, patents in “Electrical
and Electronics” are likely to be more general than patents in “Drugs and Medicals”,
especially in light of the higher propensity of citations within these fields rather than
between, as discussed above (the average of cGi in “Electrical and Electronics” is 0.503,
compared to 0.434 in “Drugs and Medicals”). In case IntShare is higher for patents in
“Drugs and Medicals” and the technology fields in “Drugs and Medicals” are defined too
broadly, β1 will be downward-biased.
In order to test this concern, the estimation results with additional four generality
measures are reported, as described in section 3. Table 4 summarizes the estimation
results. The negative and significant eﬀect of cGi on IntShare is highly robust across the
diﬀerent field classifications. Regarding Complexity, it is always negative and significant,
with the exception of the SubIPC specification, where the eﬀect of Complexity disappears.
Similarly, PatShare is positive and significant, with the exception of the SIC − IPC
specification, where it is not significant.
[Table 4 about here]
5.2.3. Adding Originality
The third robustness test looks at an additional “basicness” characteristic: the originality
of the patent (following Henderson, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (1993)). Originality measures
the extent knowledge builds on many technology fields, under the conjecture that a more
original patent integrates pieces of knowledge frommany diﬀerent areas of research. In this
respect, more original patents are also more basic. Originality is constructed as following:
Oi = 1−
X
n
µ
CMin
CMi
¶2
(5.6)
Where, n denotes fields that patent i cites, CMin is the number of citations made by
patent i to field n and CMi is the total number of citations made by patent i.
Similarly to generality, originality is downward biased for patents that make a small
number of citations. Thus, in all specifications where originality is included the number
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of citations made by patent i (labeled as BackCites) is also included. The equivalent
bias-correction is:
cOi = µ CMiCMi − 1
¶
Oi (5.7)
For originality, backward looking data is used. Since information on citations made is
available only from 1975 onwards, the sample of originating patents now includes only the
patents that were granted between 1975 and 1980.
The estimation results for the eﬀect of originality are reported in table 5. In all
specifications, there is a negative and significant eﬀect of originality on IntShare. In
columns 1 and 2 only cOi and BackCites are included with and without firm fixed-eﬀects,
respectively. There is no important change in the coeﬃcient on cOi when firm fixed-
eﬀects are added, which implies that cOi is not strongly correlated with characteristics
of the inventing firm. In column 3, cGi and Ci tes are added. The coeﬃcient on cOi
halves, however it remains significant. Hence, there is a positive correlation between
originality and generality, which implies that inventions that synthesize knowledge from
many technology fields (i.e., more original), also spread to more technology fields (i.e.,
more general). Yet, even when controlling for generality, the coeﬃcient on originality
remains negative and significant.
In columns 4 and 5 Complexity and PatShare are added with no major change in the
results.
Overall, there is strong evidence that not only the generality of knowledge matters for
technological internalization, but also its originality. There is no reason to suspect that
more original patents will have lower technological internalization. One possibility would
be that more original patents are also more general (the correlation between generality
and originality is 0.3). I also add an interaction term between originality and generality
to test whether the eﬀect of originality comes only from the higher likelihood of being
more general. The coeﬃcient on the interaction term is positive but not significant (0.372
with a standard error of 0.472) and there is no important change in the coeﬃcients on
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either originality or generality (-0.559 with a standard error of 0.279 and -1.685 with a
standard error of 0.296, respectively). From this is concluded that there is a separate
channel through which more original patents exhibit less technological internalization, in
addition to the higher likelihood of also being more general.
[Table 5 about here]
5.2.4. A Probit estimation
The final robustness test relates to the probability that a patent creates Internalized
spillovers. Only about 30 percent of patents in the sample create Internalize spillovers
(where 70 percent of the patents create only Externalized spillovers). Table 6 reports the
estimation results of a Probit specification where the dependent variable is a dummy that
receives the value of one if the patent creates Internalized spillovers and zero otherwise.
The results are highly consistent with previous findings. As patents become more general
and original, the probability of creating Internalized spillovers drops.
Thus, not only that generality and originality are negatively correlated with the share of
Internalized spillovers, they are also negatively correlated with the probability of creating
positive Internalized spillovers.
Complexity has a positive and significant eﬀect in the Probit specification (where in
previous estimations, its eﬀect was significantly negative). This implies that the proba-
bility of creating positive Internalized spillovers is higher when knowledge “spills”to fields
that are more diversified in terms of the possibilities they introduce for follow-up research.
Thus, when the inventing firm has more possibilities for reabsorbing its “spilled” knowl-
edge, the probability that some internalization of spillovers occurs rises.
[Table 6 about here]
5.3. Market value and technological internalization
The eﬀect of the knowledge stock of the firm on its market value should incorporate the
dynamic consideration of technological internalization. This section shows that IntShare
positively aﬀect private returns to knowledge in a market value estimation framework. Es-
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timating the eﬀect of IntShare on market value would also allow quantifying the negative
eﬀect of generality on private returns.
Since this section exploits the firm-level variation in technological internalization,
IntShare is aggregated to the firm-level by taking its mean over the set of originating
patents held by the inventing firms. For ease of notations, IntShare is not relabeled,
however, in this section it refers only to the firm-level aggregate.
5.3.1. Accounting data
The accounting data (sales, R&D, capital, etc.) and market value data for the sample of
inventing firms is taken from US Compustat for the period 1980-2001. The accounting
data have been ‘cleaned’ to remove accounting years with extremely large jumps in sales,
employment or capital signalling merger and acquisition activity, leaving a total of 476
firms and 9,454 observations.
Table A2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for InShare as well as for the main
accounting variables. About 40 percent of firms do not create Internalized spillovers at
all, whereas all firms create Externalized spillovers (where only about 30 percent of patents
create Internalized spillovers).
In order to estimate the eﬀect of technological internalization on private returns, a
simple version of the value function approach proposed by Griliches (1981)35 is adopted.
The market value of firm i at period t, Vit, takes the following form:
Vit = κit (Ait + (γ0 + γ1IntSharei)Kit) (5.8)
Where, Ait denotes physical assets, Kit is the R&D stock (representing knowledge
stock), γ is the shadow price of the R&D stock (higher values of γ indicate that the
market valuation of the knowledge stock relative to physical stock rises)36. The term
γ0 + γ1IntSpilli captures the private returns to innovation, which are expected to rise
with IntShare (i.e., γ1 is expected to be positive).
35See also Jaﬀe (1986), Hall et al (2005) or Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004).
36A constant returns in the market value function has been assumed, consistently with previous studies.
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Taking logarithms and dividing by Ait, the left-hand-side of equation (5.1) becomes
the traditional Tobin’s average Q, where its deviation from unity depends on the ratio
between the R&D stock to the tangible stock
¡
K
A
¢
, IntShare and κit, as following:
log
µ
Vit
Ait
¶
= log κit + log
µ
1 + (γ0 + γ1IntSharei)
Kit
Ait
¶
(5.9)
Finally, κit is specified as:
log κit = X 0itβ0 + β1IntSharei + τ t + ηi + it (5.10)
Where, Xit is a vector of controls (such as industry and technology dummies, sales,
patents stock, etc.), τ t is a complete set of time dummies, ηi is the firm fixed-eﬀect, which
is discussed later in this section, and it is an idiosyncratic error term. The linear terms of
IntShare is included mainly as a control for their interaction with the R&D stock. Since
IntShare has many zero values, a dummy for IntShare equals zero is always included.
Thus, the following equation is estimated by non-linear least squares (where standard
errors are clustered by firms):
log
µ
Vit
Ait
¶
= X 0itβ0+β1IntSharei+log
µ
1 + (γ0 + γ1IntSharei)
Kit
Ait
¶
+τ t+ηi+it (5.11)
5.3.2. Estimation results for Tobin’s Q
All the Tobin’s Q specifications include a complete set of two-digit industry dummies (78
dummy variables), a set of indicators for the share of patents the firm has in each of the six
main technology sectors, a complete set of year dummies (20 dummy variables), a dummy
variable that receives the value one if the R&D stock of the firm is zero and a dummy
variable that receives the value one if IntShare is zero37.
37I control for firm fixed-eﬀects by adopting the “mean scaling” approach developed by Blundell, Griﬃth
and Van Reenen (1999). Their method assumes that computing the mean of Tobin’s Q in a long enough
pre-estimation period can be used as an initial condition to proxy for unobserved heterogeneity, if the first
moment is stationary.
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Table 7 reports the estimation results of equation (5.11). There is strong evidence of
a positive eﬀect of IntShare on market values both interacted with the R&D stock and
linearly. This supports technological internalization being an important channel through
which private rents are appropriated in a dynamic framework of sequential innovation38.
Belenzon (2006) reports numerous robustness tests that support and extend this finding
(for brevity, they are no reported here)39.
Based on the estimates reported in column 2, the elasticity of market value with respect
to the R&D stock, evaluated at the mean, is 0.11040. This implies that an additional one
dollar spent on R&D raises market value by 0.302 dollar (referred to as private returns).
A one standard deviation increase in IntShare raises private returns to 0.452 dollar (thus,
a 50 percent increase).
Given this estimate, the eﬀect of generality on private returns could be simply com-
puted (∂V
∂ bG = ∂V∂IntShare × ∂ntShare∂ bG ). From column 5 in table 3, a one standard deviation
decrease in bG raises IntShare at the patent level by 0.344 (0.319× 1.079). Suppose that
the same increase occurs for IntShare at the firm level (e.g., the generality of all patents
held by the inventing firm drops by one standard deviation). At the mean, a 0.344 increase
in IntShare raises the valuation of an additional one dollar spend on R&D by 4.8 percent
(50× 0.344
3.524)
41. Similar calculations show that when moving from the most general ( bG = 1)
38Belenzon (2006) estimates the eﬀects of IntSpill and ExtSpill: IntSpill has a positive and significant
eﬀect and ExtSpill has a negative and significant eﬀect. Both are identified via their interaction with the
R&D stock and linearly.
39The most important robustness test is to include the citations-weighted patents stock linearly and
interacted with the R&D stock. Firms with a larger patents stock are more likely to randomly indirectly
cite their previous patents (i.e., have a higher IntShare). In case a larger patent stock also positively
aﬀects private returns the coeﬃcient on IntShare will be upward biased. The coeﬃcients on the linear
and interacted terms of the citations-weighted patents stock are positive, yet only the linear term is
significant (0.159 with a standard error of 0.037 and 0.020 with a standard error of 0.043, respectively).
The coeﬃcients on the linear and interacted terms of IntShare remain positive and significant with no
important change in their size (see also Belenzon (2006) table 7).
40The estimated elasticity is lower from that reported in previous studies. For example, Bloom,
Schankerman and Van Reenen (2005) report an elasticity of 0.24, using a similar estimation sample
without industry or technology eﬀects.
41Moving from the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile in bG raises the market valuation of an additional
dollar spent on R&D by 6.9 percent (50× (0.765−0.282)3.524 ).
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to the most specialized knowledge ( bG = 0) private returns rise by 15.3 percent (50× 1.079
3.524),
at the mean42.
[Table 7 about here]
6. Summary and conclusions
This paper empirically tests the classical argument that inventors face insuﬃcient private
incentive for basic research (Nelson (1959), Arrow (1962)). In a dynamic framework of
sequential innovation the commercial value of basic knowledge intensifies when follow-up
developments arrive mostly from outside the boundaries of the inventing firm. Thus, for
the inventing firm to capture substantial private rents it must internalize the spillovers its
knowledge creates. The main hypothesis of this paper is that as knowledge becomes more
basic technological internalization diminishes, since only firms with a wider technology
base could achieve such internalization. The empirical prediction of this hypothesis is
that there would be a negative correlation between the generality of knowledge and tech-
nological internalization. Yet, a competing hypothesis is that firms choose the “basicness”
level of their knowledge: basic knowledge is invented only by firms with a wide technology
base that allows internalizing private rents even when they are spread over many fields.
The empirical prediction of this competing hypothesis is that the a negative correlation
between the generality of knowledge and technological internalization will be substantially
mitigated.
Using data on patents and citations a novel empirical methodology is developed that
allows measuring the extent spillovers feed back into the inventing firm. Based on this
methodology, the hypothesis that more general knowledge exhibits lower technological
internalization is confirmed. This is inconsistent with basic research being endogenously
chosen by firms (since firms that choose to conduct basic research are those that are better
42I also estimate the eﬀect of the firm-level average of bG on market value (linearly and interacted with
the R&D stock). Adding bG to column 5 in table 7 does not aﬀect the coeﬃcient on IntShare in an
important way. The coeﬃcients on the linear and interacted terms of bG are negative but not significant
(-0.071 with a standard error of 0.048 and -0.269 with a standard error of 0.221).
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able to achieve high technological internalization).
A market value equation is estimated to confirm that technological internalization is an
important channel through which private rents are appropriated. The estimates from the
value function are then used to quantify the impact of generality on private returns. A one
standard deviation increase in technological internalization raises the market valuation of
an additional dollar spent on R&D by 50 percent, evaluated at the mean. Based on this
estimate, a one standard deviation increase in the generality of knowledge lowers private
returns by 4.8 percent. Moving from the most specialized to the most general knowledge
(the two extreme points on the generality spectrum) lowers private returns by 15.3 percent,
evaluated at the mean.
The findings of this paper are interpreted as supporting the classical problem of un-
derinvestment in basic research. Private returns depend on the extent the inventing firm
internalizes the spillovers its knowledge creates. Such internalization is less likely to occur
as knowledge becomes more general, and in this respect more basic.
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A. Appendices
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Figure A1: An example for an Externalized line of research
Figure A1: This figure shows a unique line of research originated in invention 3,836,478,
which is owned by IBM (the inventing firm). Since knowledge did not return to IBM in
the period 1974-1989, this line of research is Externalized.
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Figure A2: An example for an Internalized line of research
Figure A2: This figure shows a unique line of research originated in invention 4,131,983,
which is owned by Texas Instruments (the inventing firm). Since knowledge returned to
Texas Instruments in the period 1979-1994, this line of research is Internalized.
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Figure A3: This figure presents the number of citations made and received by patents
in our sample. The upward sloping graph shows the number of citations made each year,
where the U shaped curve shows the number of citations received each year.
A.1. Data
The sample combines data from two datasets:
The NBER USPTO patents database includes detailed patenting and citations
information for around 2,600 US firms (as described in Hall, Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg (2001))
and a list of all the citations made in the period 1975-1999.
The Compustat North-America dataset provides full accounts data for over
25,000 US firms from 1980 to 2001. This provides information on the key accounting
information of R&D, fixed assets, employment, sales, etc.
I started by matching the Compustat accounting data to the USPTO data, and kept
firms with 1 or more patents in the period 1969-1980 that received at least one citation
from the 2,600 firms in the NBER USPTO data set between 1975 and 1995. This leaves
a sample of 492 firms.
The accounting dataset has been ‘cleaned’ to remove accounting years with extremely
large jumps (>+200% or <-66%) in sales, employment or capital signaling merger and
acquisition activity, leaving a total of 476 firms and 9,454 observations.
The book value of capital is the net stock of property, plant and equipment (Compustat
Mnemonic PPENT); Employment is the number of employees (EMP). R&D (XRD) is used
to create R&D capital stocks calculated using a perpetual inventory method with a 15%
depreciation rate (Hall et al, 2005). The citations-weighted patent stock was constructed
by normalizing the number of patents the firm owns according to the number of citations
it receives and the average number of citations to all patents in the same year. Given this
normalized patents count the stock is constructed using the perpetual inventory method.
The citations stock (used as a pre-estimation control) was constructed equivalently to the
R&D stock. For Tobin’s Q, firm value is the sum of the values of common stock, preferred
stock, total debt net of current assets (Mnemonics MKVAF, PSTK, DT and ACT). Book
value of capital includes net plant, property and equipment, inventories, investments in
unconsolidated subsidiaries and intangibles other than R&D (Mnemonics PPENT, INVT,
IVAEQ, IVAO and INTAN). Tobin’s Q was set to 0.1 for values below 0.1 and at 20 for
values above 20. See also Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004). Industry price deflators
were taken from Bartelsman, Becker and Gray, 2000, until 1996 and from the BEA 4-digit
NAICS Shipment Price Deflators afterwards. See Belenzon (2006) for more detail on the
construction of the accounting data.
40
Number of lines 
of researcha
1979-19801976-19781969-1975Total sampleTotal sample
7.2%7.6%8.2%7.6%46.8Pooled
5.7%6.3%6.4%6.2%28.8Chemicals
7.1%7.1%8.8%7.6%30.2Computers and Communications
8.4%16.8%19.1%15.0%16.8Drugs and Medicals
7.5%7.1%7.5%7.4%78Electrical and Electronics
7.9%9.1%9.1%8.8%15.5Mechanicals
bComputed as the ratio between Internalized lines of research and the total number of lines of research.
Table 1
 Internalized and Externalized lines of research
Share of Internalized lines of research b
aComputed as the average number of lines of research per citations received by an originating patent for 
the entire period of the sample.
(6)(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
-1.282*-1.311*-1.627*-1.654*-1.665*-1.728*Generality
(0.187)(0.194)(0.198)(0.204)(0.210)(0.215)
-0.098*-0.097*-0.098*-0.098*-0.102*-0.099*Cites 
(0.009)(0.009)(0.010)(0.010)(0.010)(0.010)
7.752*PatCon
(1.940)
-0.021*-0.021*Complexity
(0.004)(0.004)
7.559*7.545*PatShare
(2.638)(2.608)
YesYesYesYesNoNoFirm-fixed effects
92,03292,03292,03292,03292,03292,032Observations
0.3380.3370.3370.3360.3220.321R²
Table 2
The effect of Generality on IntShare
Cites is the number of direct citations the originating patent receives (over the period 
1975-1999). PatCon is a firm-level measure of research diversification (it is collinear 
with the firm fixed-effect). A higher PatCon implies a lower research diversification. 
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial 
correlation (clustered by firms).
All regressions include a complete set of two-digit technology field dummies (36), grant 
year dummies (10) and a dummy for IntShare equals zero.
Dependent variable: IntShare. OLS estimation
Generality, Complexity and PatShare are based on the US Nclass classification.
* denotes a significance level of 5 percent.
(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
-1.079*-1.096*-1.179*-1.197*-1.249*Generality
(0.125)(0.129)(0.132)(0.135)(0.145)
-0.098*-0.097*-0.097*-0.097*-0.099*Cites 
(0.009)(0.009)(0.009)(0.009)(0.010)
-0.021*-0.021*Complexity
(0.004)(0.004)
10.933*11.008*PatShare
(4.346)(4.338)
YesYesYesYesNoFirm-fixed effects
92,03292,03292,03292,03292,032Observations
0.3370.3360.3370.3360.321R²
Table 3
The effect of the Weighted-Generality on IntShare
Cites is the number of direct citations the originating patent receives (over the period 
1975-1999).
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial 
correlation (clustered by firms).
All regressions include a complete set of two-digit technology field dummies (36), 
grant year dummies (10) and a dummy for IntShare equals zero.
Dependent variable: IntShare. OLS estimation
Generality, Complexity and PatShare are based on the US Nclass classification.
* denotes a significance level of 5 percent.
(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
SIC-IPCSubIPCSubHJTIPC Nclass
-1.466*-2.007*-1.091*-1.359*-1.486*Generality
(0.196)(0.263)(0.152)(0.209)(0.188)
-0.099*-0.095*-0.099*-0.098*-0.098*Cites 
(0.010)(0.009)(0.010)(0.010)(0.009)
-0.018*-0.001-0.052*-0.005*-0.021*Complexity
(0.005)(0.005)(0.007)(0.001)(0.004)
-3.24918.516*8.200*15.288*10.580*PatShare
(4.153)(6.425)(2.599)(4.418)(4.314)
YesYesYesYesYesFirm-fixed effects
92,03292,03292,03292,03292,032Observations
0.3360.3360.3370.3380.337R²
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial 
correlation (clustered by firms).
All regressions include a complete set of two-digit technology field dummies (36), 
grant year dummies (10) and a dummy for IntShare equals zero.
Cites is the number of direct citations the originating patent receives (over the 
period 1975-1999).
* denotes a significance level of 5 percent.
Table 4
Dependent variable: IntShare. OLS estimation
The effect of Generality on IntShare: alternative measures of 
Generality
(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
-0.445*-0.442*-0.523*-1.049*-1.084Originality
(0.157)(0.158)(0.162)(0.027)(0.212)
-1.873*-1.746*-1.992*Generality
(0.312)(0.311)(0.338)
-0.055*-0.059*-0.057*-0.092*-0.097*BackCites
(0.020)(0.020)(0.021)(0.023)(0.023)
-0.093*-0.084*-0.084*Cites
(0.012)(0.011)(0.011)
-0.028*-0.029*Complexity
(0.005)(0.005)
14.575*14.529*PatShare
(5.106)(5.159)
0.169*Forward Lag
(0.028)
YesYesYesYesNoFirm-fixed effects
38,74538,74538,74538,74538,745Observations
0.3190.3180.3160.3070.281R²
Table 5
The effect of Generality and Originality on IntShare
Dependent variable: IntShare. OLS estimation.
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial 
correlation (clustered by firms).
Cites is the number of direct citations the originating patent receives (over the 
period 1975-1999). BackCites is the number of citations made by the originating 
patent. 
Since Originality and BackCites are backwards looking, the sample of 
originating patents covers only the originating patents granted between 1975 
and 1980 (since data on citations made start at 1975).
Generality, Originality, Complexity and PatShare are based on the US Nclass 
classification.
All regressions include a complete set of two-digit technology field dummies 
(36), grant year dummies (10) and a dummy for IntShare equals zero.
* denotes a significance level of 5 percent.
(6)(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
-0.103*-0.119*-0.111*-0.109*-0.129*-0.123*Generality
(0.039)(0.043)(0.044)(0.030)(0.035)(0.036)
-0.048*-0.055*-0.050*Originality
(0.024)(0.025)(0.026)
0.036*0.036*0.036*0.033*0.034*0.034*Cites  
(0.002)(0.002)(0.002)(0.001)(0.002)(0.002)
0.020*0.021*0.020*BackCites
(0.003)(0.003)(0.003)
0.004*0.004*0.003*0.003*Complexity
(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)(0.001)
0.656*0.851*PatShare
(0.322)(0.332)
38,74538,74538,74592,03292,03292,032Observations
0.1190.1180.1170.1250.1240.123R²
Table 6
The effect of Generality and Originality the probability to internalize
Dependent variable: A dummy for a positive IntShare.  Probit estimation.
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial correlation 
(clustered by firms).
Cites is the number of direct citations the originating patent receives (over the period 
1975-1999). BackCites is the number of citations made by the originating patent. 
Since Originality and BackCites are backwards looking, the sample of originating patents 
covers only the originating patents granted between 1975 and 1980 (since data on 
citations made start at 1975).
All regressions include a complete set of two-digit technology field dummies (36) and 
grant year dummies (10).
* denotes a significance level of 5 percent.
(5)(4)(3)(2)(1)
0.217*0.141*0.135*0.120*0.330*R&D stock/Assets
(0.040)(0.026)(0.026)(0.064)(0.101)
1.311* 
(0.586)
1.379* 
(0.498)
1.702* 
(0.533)
2.341* 
(0.507)
5.624* 
(2.295)
IntShare x (R&D 
stock/Assets)
0.025*0.020*0.016*IntShare
(0.007)(0.006)(0.004)
0.033*0.035*log(Sales)
(0.004)(0.004)
-0.011*-0.005*log(Industry Sales)
(0.006)(0.006)
0.538*Sales Growth
(0.018)
YesYesYesYesNoPre-sample meansa
9,0159,4549,4549,4549,454Observations
0.5040.4990.4960.4960.294R²
Industry Sales is the aggregated sales of firms in the same for-digit SIC as the 
inventing firm (see Belenzon (2006) for detail). Sales Growth is the growth in the 
sales of the inventing firm.
Table 7
The effect of IntShare on Tobin's Q
Dependent variable: log(Tobin's-Q). Nonlinear Least Squares.
Standard errors (in brackets) are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and serial 
correlation (clustered at the firm level). * denotes a significant level of 5 percent.
All regressions include 78 two-digits industry dummies, 4 technology indicators, a 
complete set of year dummies, a dummy variable for R&D stock equals zero and a 
dummy variable for IntShare equals zero.
aThe set of pre-sample means includes: Market Share, Employees, Tobin's Q, Sales, 
Assets, R&D stock, Patents stock and Citations stock.
IntShare is the firm-level average of the patent-level IntShare.
MaximumMinimumStd DevMedianMean variable
100012.690.004.689IntShare
0.930.00.260.500.432Generality
2331.420.5712.2417.685Complexity
100.090.020.055PatShare
100.270.440.377Originalitya
428211.858.0010.980Cites
940.02.954.004.930BackCitesa
260.03.758.338.643Backward Laga
1504.077.007.67Forward Lag
Cites is the number of direct citations the originating patent receives (over the period 
1975-1999). BackCites is the number of citations made by the originating patent. 
Forward Lag is the average difference between the grant year of the patents that cite 
the originating patent and the grant year of the originating patent. Backward Lag is the 
average difference between the grant year of the originating patent and the grant year 
of the patents it cites.
Patents' main characteristics
aThe backward looking variables: Originality, Backward Tech, Backward Citations and 
Backward Lag, are computed only for the patents that were granted between 1975 
and 1980.
Table A1
Generality, Originality, Complexity and PatShare are based on the US Nclass 
classification. Generality is not bias-corrected.
Standard 
deviationMaxMinMedianMeanMnemonicVariable 
3.5224.6300.282.17IntShare1
2.34200.11.322V/ATobin's Q
16,782485,56605924,689VMarket value, $m
319547343049806KR&D stock, $m
11000.200.39K/AR&D stock / Assets
9,736199,3032.133923,090ACapital stock, $m
11,412180,55706863,925Sales, $m
4899,8480.42 18155Patents stock
58512,6430.2816158Patents stock weighted 
by citations
Table A2
Descriptive statistics: accounting and patents variables
9,454 observations and 476 firms
The statistics are computed over all the observations that were included in the estimation (1980-2001) and 
are given in thousands of 1996 USD.
1For about 40 percent of firms IntShare is zero. 
IntShare is the firm-level average of the patent-level IntShare.
MaxMinStd DevMedianMean variable
100.3190.5930.517Nclass
100.3240.5950.520IPC
100.3150.4490.399SubHJT
100.2290.8930.818SubIPC
100.3170.5000.433SIC
428211.8508.00010.967Citesa
SICSubIPCSubHJTIPCNclassvariable
1.000Nclass
1.0000.671IPC
1.0000.6120.802SubHJT
1.0000.3620.4870.451SubIPC
1.0000.6100.6720.6100.721SIC
0.0540.1130.0600.0590.072Cites
Table A3
Generality (bias-corrected)
The correlation between the alternative Generality 
measures
Cites is the number of direct citations the originating patent receives 
(over the period 1975-1999).
bRefers to the Generality measure which is based on Nclass fields 
definition, where the citing fields are weighted by their proximity to the 
cited field (using citations proximity metric).
Descriptive statistics for Generality (bias-corrected)
a5,052 patents in the initial sample receive only one citation, thus, the 
bias-corrected measures are not defined. These patents were dropped 
from the sample.
MaxMinStd DevMedianMean 
55810255.91489.7number of citations
21959.01037.06075.112066.011153.9Potentially cited patents
10300.0198.01764.71801.02242.2Potentially citing patents
199419637.619741974cited grant year
199519755.819871987citing grant year
19.13001.1700.07910.418citation frequency (10xe-5)
3217.611.512.3lag in years
15039.2453.12298.04108.44458.2regression weight
0.99600.3650.7500.629Weighted-generality
1.500.4240.9460.793Bias-corrected weighted-
generality
The entries in the table refers to the citations "cell", as described in the text. Citations 
frequency is the dependent variable in equation (the estimation equation of the 
propensity of citations). The cited "cells" are include the dimensions of the grant year and 
main technology class of the cited patents. The citing "cells" include the dimensions of 
the grant year and HJT sub-category technology class of the citing patents. The lag in 
years is the difference between the grant year of the citing patent and the grant year of 
the cited patent for every "cell". Potentially cited and citing patents for a given "cell" are 
defined as following: the number of patents in a given main technology class in a given 
year for potentially cited patents and the number of patents in a given HJT sub-category 
technology class in a given year for the potentially citing patents.
Table A4
Descriptive statistics for the propensity of citations estimation and 
weighted-generality
HJT Subcategory class name
HJT 
Subcategory 
class number
Main technology class
OthersMechanicalElectrical and Electronic
Drugs and 
Medical
Computers and 
CommunicationsChemical
-0.718-0.904-0.961-0.566-0.9721.000Agriculture,Food,Textiles11Chemical
-0.656-0.740-0.690-0.799-0.8720.702Coating Chemical12Chemical
-0.745-0.799-0.719-0.857-0.9491.703Gas     Chemical13Chemical
-0.977-0.984-0.992-0.347-0.9940.304Organic Compounds14Chemical
-0.839-0.909-0.975-0.708-0.9771.333Resins  Chemical15Chemical
-0.803-0.781-0.746-0.776-0.8791.233Miscellaneous-chemical19Chemical
-0.790-0.853-0.847-0.675-0.9401.046Average
-0.936-0.861-0.126-0.94411.993-0.971Communications21Computers and Communications
-0.905-0.6340.193-0.95216.012-0.965Computer Hardware & Software22Computers and Communications
-0.879-0.713-0.050-0.97113.123-0.854Computer Peripherials23Computers and Communications
-0.952-0.858-0.329-0.99212.416-0.971Information Storage24Computers and Communications
-0.918-0.767-0.078-0.96513.386-0.940Average
-0.950-0.981-0.9933.141-0.996-0.368Drugs31Drugs and Medical
-0.793-0.868-0.59510.236-0.711-0.858Surgery & Med Inst.32Drugs and Medical
-0.919-0.977-0.9314.103-0.978-0.516Biotechnology33Drugs and Medical
-0.901-0.860-0.8976.904-0.933-0.848Miscellaneous39Drugs and Medical
-0.891-0.921-0.8546.096-0.905-0.647Average
-0.908-0.8923.158-0.966-0.139-0.946Electrical Devices41Electrical and Electronic
-0.930-0.8773.138-0.971-0.523-0.938Electrical Lighting42Electrical and Electronic
-0.902-0.8502.907-0.8330.107-0.911Measuring & Testing43Electrical and Electronic
-0.916-0.8143.299-0.914-0.126-0.905Nuclear & X-rays44Electrical and Electronic
-0.886-0.7153.698-0.970-0.331-0.904Power Systems45Electrical and Electronic
-0.954-0.9175.256-0.993-0.049-0.797Semiconductor Devices46Electrical and Electronic
-0.8390.0313.443-0.9240.971-0.926Miscellaneous49Electrical and Electronic
-0.905-0.7193.557-0.939-0.013-0.904Average
-0.7561.025-0.862-0.914-0.785-0.756Mat. Proc & Handling51Mechanical
-0.7930.751-0.541-0.945-0.854-0.840Metal Working52Mechanical
-0.8281.366-0.691-0.940-0.737-0.937Motors & Engines + Parts53Mechanical
-0.9161.262-0.413-0.945-0.094-0.862Optics  Mech54Mechanical
0.8820.001-0.829-0.988-0.782-0.961Transportation55Mechanical
-0.7660.968-0.831-0.911-0.611-0.890Miscellaneous59Mechanical
-0.5290.895-0.695-0.941-0.644-0.874Average
0.064-0.919-0.902-0.770-0.947-0.856Agriculture,Husbandry,Food61Others
0.723-0.859-0.895-0.946-0.643-0.971Amusement Devices62Others
0.778-0.846-0.904-0.803-0.922-0.910Apparel & Textile63Others
1.342-0.708-0.880-0.967-0.881-0.811Earth Working & Wells64Others
0.766-0.792-0.911-0.794-0.934-0.959Furniture,House Fixtures65Others
0.900-0.806-0.656-0.969-0.919-0.791Heating Others66Others
0.753-0.606-0.823-0.898-0.966-0.903Pipes & Joints67Others
1.108-0.731-0.906-0.858-0.938-0.865Receptacles68Others
0.577-0.699-0.760-0.898-0.718-0.693Miscellaneous69Others
0.779-0.774-0.848-0.878-0.874-0.862Average
Table A5
The propensity of citations between technology "cells"
The entries in the table are the estimated propensity of citations between "cells" of patent citations, as explained in the text. The rows represent the citing patents and the columns represent 
the cited patent. All entries are relative to the propensity of citations from "Agriculture,Food,Textiles" to "Chemicals" (which is normalized to unity). For example, the propensity of citations 
from a randomly drawn patent from "Semiconductor Devices" to a randomly drawn patent from "Electrical and Electronic" is 5.256 times the propensity of citations of the benchmark "cell" .
Main technology class name 
Inventing 
firmCitesGeneralityIntShareGrant yearUS NclassPatent
156180.91501969523420032
229180.90901971163551940
2449220.931019732693711081
1466570.927019745233787351
511150.918019765243931090
2221330.08951.319714263619207
1753450.05156.919743243849721
2452300.07980.719754243906090
2452250.09976.119754243929987
22290.07454.119791234159011
These patents exemplify the negative correlation between Generality and IntShare. I focus 
on patents that are highly cited since these patents are likely to generate a substantial 
diffusion "tree". 
Table A6
Examples of patents with high Generality and low IntShare, and patents 
with low Generality and high IntShare
High Generality and low IntShare
Low Generality and high IntShare
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